July 7, 2016
June 24, 2016
March 29, 2016
February 26, 2016
This report outlines an analytical framework through which constraints imposed by financial markets on decision-making in the European Union (EU) both at the national and at the EU level can be understood in the context of the latest economic and financial crisis. The report departs from the notion of ‘political citizenship’ as an analytical device for understanding how financial market constraints are reflected in political decisions and discusses in how far such constraints restrict or are compatible with European political citizenship rights. This aspect remains an under-studied element of EU decision-making. The report concludes that the question of in how far financial markets constrain political decision-making cannot be treated separately from understanding how financial market developments are translated into specific policy options by executive and legislative decision-makers in the context of the decentralised and multi-level economic governance architecture of the euro area. In this context a small transnational elite group of senior civil servants and central bank officials plays a particular role as they interpret financial market developments and map out policy options for elected executive and legislative decision-makers. This report is related to the bEUcitizenship report ‘Democratic parliamentary control in times of crisis’ which covers a comparative case study on four different countries which is built upon the framework advanced in this report.
Click here for the full text: D8.1 FINAL
This deliverable aims to analyse how Canada deals with diversity, internal minorities and immigration at legal and political levels. This exercise is intended to be a source of inspiration for EU policies in the field of diversity. The text is divided in six sections on history of the case study, minorities and diversity at legal and political levels, challenges and general policy recommendations. We draw our conclusions based on a systematic analysis of the recent bibliography and data on this topic.
Features such as diversity in immigration policies, internal minorities and majorities, multiple historical interpretations and constitutional debates on how to accommodate this diversity are common both in Canada and the EU. Moreover, the Canadian case, as we show, is probably among the most relevant examples of federalism and multiculturalism among the world. The main questions guiding the chapter are related to diversity managing. What are the origins of diversity in Canada? Why is history relevant for understanding diversity? How the federal structure shapes immigration policies? Which are the main demands among ethnic and cultural minorities?
In the last section, we point out aspects that coincide or could inspire the European Union institutions. Canada and the EU somehow reflect the Tocqueville’s paradox, while become more mixed and cosmopolitan, national and territorial identities become stronger and more relevant in politics. Both the origins of the EU and Canada and also their institutional structure differ. However, several aspects can be a mirror for European institutions. For example, the capacity of the Canadian federal model to accommodate multiple citizenship regimes, the development of a decentralized immigration policy and, most importantly, its multicultural approach while maintaining its internal diversity concerning the francophone minorities, the First Nations and immigration. These policies and constitutional arrangements are not absent of political tensions but we claim that could be a source of inspiration for the EU, a Canadian mirror.
For the full text click here: D4.4 – Canada_20170221
1. EU integration is trying to achieve more political integration and accommodation of a much higher degree of diversity in much less time than has ever been the case in Switzerland. Integration and expansion processes that were slower and non-linear in Switzerland and that happened in separate phases (e.g. religious diversification, linguistic diversification, territorial expansion, etc.) are all going on at the same time in the EU. Especially integration and accession with enormous shocks of diversification are engineered at the same time in the EU. From this point of view, the EU has already tried to go beyond many stages that took centuries to be completed in Switzerland.
The speed and intergovernmental method of European integration and accession has been marked by relative success in times of peace, stability and economic growth. But what has been achieved seems less politically stable and consolidated in time of crisis. The contextual differences between the EU and Swiss integration process notwithstanding, we think it is fair to say that the consolidation of the EU integration process may also be achieved by de-acceleration and by abolishing the doctrine of strict process-linearity of ever more integration of all policy areas. The integration process should rather concentrate on policy areas that are directly relevant to overall territorial security and economic stability as the background conditions to European citizenship. Secondly, the comparison shows that the foundation of a few but robust federal state institutions in Switzerland in 1848 was a moderately coercive act that should not be romanticized by calling Switzerland a “nation of will”. The “will” to be a nation was construed post factum by a slow process in which the introduction of a coherent system of direct democracy at all levels of integration was key.
2. The institutional design of the European Union seems to echo quite well the federal state formation process in Switzerland. The following precisions are however necessary in the comparative perspective. First, the momentary stage of European Integration, characterized by intergovernmental crisis management, resembles the (dysfunctional) intergovernmental centralism of the Swiss cantons during the decades before the formation of the federal-state in 1848. Second, due to the greater diversity of the European Union, this quasi-federal system has derived in extreme asymmetries between the member states. Since EU identity is not well entrenched among European citizens (and politicians), it has been hard to design institutions and policies of common territorial protection and redistribution and there is mistrust towards centralistic EU institutions (specially in the countries more affected by the economic crisis). Most European citizens do not feel that their interests are taken into account by the European Union. Third, it is important to note that in Swiss federalism the municipalities play an important role, they are much more than just administrative districts. This city-centred and bottom up construct of citizenship is guaranteed by the Swiss federal constitution. Citizens feel that their most immediate and local identity is not jeopardized but rooted in and guaranteed by the Swiss federal constitution. Compared to sub-national Swiss federalism, EU federalism is entirely focused on the nation-state and the EU institutions. Serious consideration ought to be given to the idea that European citizenship is not only about bringing citizenship to a higher European level but also about bringing it more to the root-level of citizenship: the city.
3. Direct democracy has acted as a federator in the Swiss context. Switzerland made direct democracy and direct democracy made Switzerland. There has been a slow and iterative process of adaptation of structurally similar institutions of direct democracy at all levels (communal, cantonal, federal) of all units (all communes, all cantons, confederation roughly between 1830-1891. To the contrary, the EU is only incipiently in a process of introducing direct democracy (in some member-states and ECI), and so far direct democracy is mainly practiced as national plebiscitary democracy. Under this guise it is seen as a threat to EU integration and probably not without good reason.1 While in Switzerland the coherent introduction of direct democracy at all levels of the polity in the long run served as an important unifier, direct democracy has even not been considered as integrative part of all levels of political integration in the EU.
4. It is of great interest that the one element in which the European Union has based the construction of EU citizenship and identity – mobility of residence – has been implicitly discouraged in Switzerland. The institutional design as incorporated in Swiss multicultural identity (which aims fundamentally at the protection of cantonal autonomy, culture and language) has facilitated that Switzerland is called today a successful multicultural society. Most citizens identify with Switzerland as a country and they like it as it is, but they do not want to take advantage of their formal right to move to other parts of the country, especially not across language borders. The same institutional design that has made of Switzerland a successful case of multiculturalism and democracy poses important barriers that make it difficult for the Swiss to move their residence across their country. Considering that one of the main features of European citizenship is the freedom of movement and residence, this poses a main concern. The Swiss compromise between the formal right and economic necessity of mobility on the one hand and the protection of political and cultural sub-identities on the other hand, is commuting. Due to the vast size, this is of limited applicability in the EU. However, in a Europe of cities and trans-border regions, commuting is an important option provided that every European citizen lives reasonably close to an important economic centre. Here again there is reason for the EU to not only focus on the member-states economies but on the urban centres and regions.
The necessary infrastructure for swift commuting (and change of residency) is not only transportation. Supporting the Swiss system of commuting is fiscal federalism and shared fiscal revenue, a welfare arrangement for all Swiss citizens and a system of redistribution of funds among cantons. Moving one’s residence is formally possible, bureaucratically difficult, and culturally burdensome. There is reason to believe that this is even more the case in the EU with 24 languages. In short, the Europe of commuters deserves attention in the context of EU citizenship.
Download the full report here: D4.2 – Switzerland
This paper will first offer, in PART 1, an account of the recent developments and the present situation in the areas of minorities (their numbers, locations, socioeconomic positions) and minority rights (their legal, constitutional, cultural, religious, linguistic, educational, property rights).
Secondly, in PARTS II and III, we will discuss two contemporary issues, as they relate to minorities and minority rights, based on the findings of two nation-wide opinion surveys we have designed and conducted in 2010 and 2014: first, othering and discrimination in Turkey today; second, the Kurdish question and its possible solutions.
Thirdly, in PARTS IV and V we will present a historical and theoretical account of the problematic concepts of minorities, minority rights, and in general the concepts of rights and freedoms in Turkey, placing it in the context of the historical interactions between Turkey and Europe, starting from the decline and collapse of the Ottoman Empire.
Finally, in the concluding PART VI, we will have a brief look at the major historical turning points in the 20th century, i.e. World War I, World War II, the Cold War and the beginning of the post-Cold War period, and examine the synchronisation and de-synchronization between the Turkish and European paradigms vis-à-vis the issue of rights and freedoms in general and collective rights and freedoms in particular.
Click here for the full text: D4.9 Turkey – final
Over the last decades, questions about managing linguistic pluralism and multilingualism have become a major political and scholarly concern. Linguistic diversity constitutes a salient dimension of the new social and political contexts of complex cultural diversity or ‘super-diversity’ (Vertovec 2007). Thus, a great political challenge emerges in the articulation of the functional character of different languages as a medium of social integration and of expression of collective identities.
In contexts of plurilingualism, the distribution of linguistic rights has to do with which linguistic communities, out of those co-existing in the private sphere, find recognition in the public domain. The extent to which different vehicular languages, taken as the languages used for communication among people that may have different or more than one mother tongues, may become part of a common or standardized communicative framework depends upon how linguistic policies are defined. Yet, language has both an instrumental and an expressive dimension. Whereas from an instrumental perspective, language is primarily understood as a medium that denominates things and facts, allowing thus people to communicate, the expressive aspects are crucial to how the members of a community conceive of themselves and frame their way of life (Taylor 1985). The instrumental and expressive dimensions cannot be separated easily; nor can one be reduced to the other. Linguistic policies need to be sensitive to both. However, managing the relationship between these two dimensions of language appears to be a terrain of dispute, in particular when subject to multiple political levels and actors:
Under democratic conditions, language policy is not only a tool for establishing an extensive frame of communication but it is also directed towards protecting the status or the “honour” of the members of the linguistic community and overcoming collective resentment in institutional contexts marked by cultural heterogeneity (Kraus 2008, 77).
Language is a key component of citizenship rights in a double sense. First, linguistic rights largely enable the exercise of other citizenship rights due to the ubiquity of language in all dimensions of collective life, and second, they strongly facilitate the configuration of a shared sense of community since social cohesion is not possible among a community that cannot speak fluently. Yet citizenship is a multi-layered phenomenon (Kymlicka 1995; Yuval-Davis 1999), which clearly exceeds the limits of the nation state, and has relevant developments at the sub-national level. Building on this assumption, the objective of this paper is to assess whether and how the current Spanish political regime has managed to accommodate the various linguistic communities, which in some cases overlap with the formal limits of the sub-national units, i.e. the autonomous communities (regional governments), whereas in others they do not coincide at all. More specifically, this paper aims to disentangle the political dilemmas and multifaceted claims regarding linguistic policies in Spain, being this a rather complex and subtle policy area in which multiple layers of national identity, social conflict and value formation converge. Additionally, linguistic policy often creates political tensions in the territory, not only across the national and regional levels, but also within the regional arena itself. Given these circumstances, the nature of linguistic conflicts and their political underpinnings have continuously generated controversy in both scholarly and policy debates in Spain.
There are four official languages in Spain, but only Castilian is official in the entire territory. Basque, Catalan and Galician are only co-official in certain regions, i.e. autonomous communities, and thus subject to a specific legal framework. Each of these languages, in turn, entails particular conflicts and debates in terms of which linguistic policy to follow, on the one hand, and of how to balance the use of these various languages, on the other. In addition, there are minorities in other regions, placed in well-defined territorial areas, which use any of these co-official languages, enjoying lower and dissimilar levels of protection. Finally, during the 2000s Spain received several millions of migrants coming from different countries of the world, enriching thus the linguistic diversity of the country, while also creating new challenges for already existing linguistic policies and legal frameworks. Furthermore, in recent decades the push for globalization added pressure to acquire a third language, making it still more difficult to keep the fragile equilibriums in place within and across regions.
A main outcome of this paper is that the linguistic policies established in Spain to manage the diversity of languages that exist at multiple levels since democratization are constantly exposed to political conflicts. This is because they occur at the crossroads where different types of communities interact (a la Kymlicka). First, these ‘linguistic communities’ are not always a majority in the regions where they are placed, and obviously they are a minority all-together in respect to Castilian. These linguistic communities call for recognition, linguistic rights and guarantees, including affirmative action. Second, in a number of cases they coincide with ‘sub-national communities’. These have their own identities – relying on regional institutions and policies in many areas – and which implement linguistic policies to support co-official languages to assure and expand their use vis-à-vis the use of Castilian, as far as the linguistic preferences of the majority of the population and their capabilities would allow in the short run. Third, Castilian has a powerful but undefined status in Spain: a linguae francae for some, a linguistic community of a majority of the population, and a ‘nation-state’ language in many respects. In all, there is not a consensus on the role of Castilian, which all linguistic communities in Spain accept. Finally, there are ‘migrant’ communities – internal movers, European Union (EU) movers and third-country nationals. These have expanded enormously all over the Spanish territory during the last decades, and have thus come to share spaces with most of the already existing ‘linguistic communities’, while also reshaping the sociolinguistic context to some extent. This third type of community requires a different set of policies, whose implementation lie in the hands of national and sub-national or local governments, and which should be attentive to multiculturalism and ethnic diversity, including but also going beyond linguistic issues.
A number of sub-national governments in Spain face the challenge of addressing various linguistic communities and their claims. Their policies and models attempt thus to accommodate pressures arising from different organized actors and social groups. Whereas the national government’s policies would favour the status quo where Castilian remains as the dominant language, or develop policies to expand Castilian across the map, we expect some constituencies to support political parties defending policies that attempt to strengthen co-official languages. To the extent that they are politically organized, immigrant communities might also ask for linguistic protection, multiculturalists’ rights and direct support to their cultural activities, depending on the social context and existing cleavages. Given this social and cultural complexity, defining a political strategy capable of keeping linguistic policies away from political conflict seems rather impossible.
To clarify the political dilemmas emerging from these issues, the empirical part of this paper focuses on the identification of claims made in the public sphere by representatives of any of the linguistic communities that coexist at the sub-national level in Spain regarding linguistic rights of citizens (increasing rights, protection of existing rights and claims against discrimination). Our analysis delves into four Spanish regions: Catalonia, the Balearic Islands, the Basque Country and Galicia, each of which displays very different characteristics regarding their sociolinguistic situation. In our analysis, we look more closely into the linguistic claims made in recent years (from 2005 onwards) by different actors involved in linguistic conflicts, with a particular focus on the areas of public education, media and the public space. We make use of media and document inquiry mechanisms. This information constitutes the empirical basis upon which we then provide a comparative assessment of the selected regions. We expect to find variation across the cases regarding the extent to which political and social conflicts increased, or on the contrary, they turned out to be cases of accommodation and claim reduction. Under which circumstances each of the cases falls is a matter of discussion in the comparative analysis, while the extent to which these responses can be transferred to the EU level are assessed in a specific section.
Click here for the full text: Deliverable 4.3 Spain – FINAL
The Czech Republic embodies a remarkable exception from the set of cases dealt with in this volume. From the macroscopic point of view, the Czech Republic resembles rather homogeneous country compared to Canada or Switzerland. Nationally and ethnically rather homogenous country with considerable low level of religious alignments, low profile of ethnic-based political parties and peacefully departed from Czechoslovak federation does not look intuitively to be an appropriate object of scholar research aimed at minority claims and their political treatment.
Historical path towards the present situation, however, shows much colourful picture of a country struggling with multi-ethnic, multi-linguistic, as well as multi-religious composition of the population. To simplify slightly, an observer can read the history of the second half of Czech 20th century as a history of de-complexification of Czech population. After extermination of Jewish population of Czechoslovakia, the German (and to considerable lower level Hungarian) inhabitants of Czechoslovakia were expelled, Ruthenia with Ukrainian-speaking (but with strong distinctive regional identity equipped) population was transferred to the Soviet Union and after partition of Czechoslovakia, the remaining Czech Republic left behind salient issue of Hungarian minority inhabiting Southern Slovakian regions. This short history is far from being a triumph of Czech politics of solving the ethnic and national disputes. It can rather serve as an example of how drastic measures were adopted in Europe only slightly more than half a century ago to achieve one of the ideals painted by enlightened concept of modern homogeneous nation that rules over a comprehensive territory of a nation-state.
Therefore, the important part of the study must be devoted to explanations of how the Czech lands once became multi-cultural, what problems it took along, what kind of conflict unfroze during periods of reluctant democratisation of the 19th and hasty de-democratisation of the 20th century and how the changing majority-minority configurations and clashed reached the climax in the turmoil if 1939-1945 period.
The partially coincidental, however fully accepted by political elite as well as public, strategy of violent homogenisation of the territory of the Czech Lands after the World War II did not remain without consequences for the recent politics of minority issues in the Czech Republic. By analysing the claims of politically relevant and in the same time contentious minority issues, such as situation of Czech Roma population and different strategies of its politicisation, the paper will not only show path dependency on experiences with violent unification and homogenisation of the Czech Lands but it will address important issue of how to cope with minorities, that are – for different reasons – unable to set the coherent political appeal of claims and to create sound minority. The experience with these “silent” but visible minorities with huge and risky potential of arousing political conflicts can bring some lessons for larger European Union of today.
Click here for the full text: D4.6 – Czech Republic
This report derives from the work of coordinators of Work Package 9 of the FP7 programme bEUcitizen coordinated by Utrecht University (NL) and the University of Turin (IT) and is based on the findings of four work packages focusing on the economic (WP5), social (WP6), civil (WP7) and political (WP8) citizenship rights with regards to gendered and generational biases in the access to these citizenship rights. These findings have been discussed at a panel meeting in the Oviedo work conference of the bEUcitizen consortium in June 2016. Contributions have been presented by the University of Trento (WP5; IT), the University of Oxford (WP6; UK), University of Oviedo (WP7; ES), and Utrecht University (WP8; NL). In addition, the Institut Barcelona d’Estudis Internacionals (WP4; ES) and Utrecht University (WP3, NL) have contributed to the panel meeting. This report presents the findings of these WPs as well as the discussions during the meeting. It first presents the questions the WP9 coordinators have raised regarding gendered and generational biases in the access to the four citizenship rights to each of the representatives of WP5 to 8. Second, it summarizes the reactions to these questions. Third, the discussion at the panel meeting is presented and finally some conclusions are drawn.
Click here for the full text: Deliverable 9.3
The Estonian government has taken many steps in order to integrate minorities into Estonian society. Although some international organisations’ reports indicate to obstacles in equal treatment, still the integration policy during the last twenty years can be described as successful. The latest integration policy paper until 2020 has shown the Estonia is still paying greater attention to the integration policy and cohesion between Estonian and non-Estonian people.
Estonian Government has during the decades adopted different programmes in order to develop the integration policy. The main concern is connected with Russian minorities. Although there has been some criticism, still those programmes can be evaluated as successful.
The realisation of civil and political rights is sometimes connected with ability to communicate in Estonian. The language requirements seems to be one of the most crucial issue. Although the Estonian government is seeking for opportunities to offer language courses for minorities, it seems to be, that in some regions (e.g. eastern part of Estonia) still the Russian language prevails. Still the necessary information for exercising of the political rights are also provided in Russian.
In realisation of economic, social and cultural rights the possible benefits are not connected to citizenship, but to a right to stay in Estonia (permanent or fixed term). Accessing the labour market again the problem of language has been raised. Although there is no case law, still one can observe, that the knowledge of Estonian language gives to a certain extent a better position.
For the full text click here: Deliverable 4.5 Estonia – FINAL
Tools and frameworks for executing impact assessments are useful to provide policy and decision makers with knowledge and guidance. This might help in identifying possible barriers – but also opportunities – for exercising European Union citizenship. Impact assessment is the systematic ex-ante evaluation of the likely or possible consequences of policies, project, programs and other forms of regulation. The existing Impact Assessment guideline in ‘Better Regulation guidelines’ (European Commission, 2015) focus on economic, social and environmental impacts. EU citizenship impacts need to be added to this list to overcome barriers for EU citizenship.
Therefore, in the working paper (D11.1) ‘Assessing policy implications for EU citizenship’ (Bakker et al., 2016) options for an impact assessment framework for EU citizenship are explored. In the paper favorable impact assessment approaches are identified even as elements that should be included in the framework and what requirements the framework should meet. However, before to establish an impact assessment framework for EU citizenship, it is necessary to develop indicators to assess EU citizenship. These indicators need to be formulated based on existing (impact assessment) guidelines and documents and based on outcomes of the bEUcitizen project so far. Therefore, we analysed all the deliverables of the bEUcitizen project so far to determine whether attention needs to be paid to specific topics in an impact assessment framework for EU citizenship. Annex I shows an overview of the analyzed deliverables and their topics. In this report, we sketch an overview of the most remarkable topics from the deliverables. This leads towards impact assessment indicators for EU citizenship, which will be the starting point for the Impact Assessment tool for policymakers on the European and the national level (deliverable 11.3).
For the full text click here: D11.2 – Impact Assessment
Since the Treaty of Maastricht (1992), every person holding the nationality of a European Union (EU) Member State is automatically a citizen of the EU and is granted an additional set of rights. In 2007, the Lisbon Treaty strengthened EU citizenship by making the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights legally binding and by expanding the opportunities for democratic participation and increasing the visibility of EU citizen rights. Citizens are and must be at the heart of European integration. Therefore, it is important to make citizens’ lives easier, to help them understand their rights and involve them in a debate on the Europe they want to live in and build for future generations (European Commission, 2013, p.3). At the same time, the European Commission has noted in its 2010 EU citizenship report and in its 2013 EU citizenship report that citizens face difficulties in exercising their rights and are not always aware of the rights they legally possess (European Commission, 2010; European Commission, 2013).
To overcome possible barriers and stimulate opportunities for exercising EU citizenship an impact assessment for new policies and regulations might be useful. However, existing Commissions impact assessment guidelines do not focus on EU citizenship impacts. The focus is on economic, social and environmental impacts. Therefore, it is necessary to include EU citizenship. Bakker et al. (2016, p.12) note: “An impact assessment guideline where EU citizenship is included will make decision makers aware of risks for new barriers for citizens when exercising their citizenship rights and, in an ideal world, make them aware of what policies and regulations offer increased opportunities for exercising these rights. In the long term, this leads to a European administrative reality in which it is more easy and common for individual citizens to exercise their EU citizen rights”.
To develop an impact assessment framework that focuses on EU citizenship too, different steps are taken within the bEUcitizen project. First, in the working paper (D11.1) ‘Assessing policy implications for EU citizenship’ (Bakker et al., 2016) options for an impact assessment framework for EU citizenship are explored. Favorable impact assessment approaches are identified even as the elements that should be included in the framework and what requirements the framework should meet. Second, in (D11.2) ‘Towards Impact Assessment indicators for EU citizenship’ (Bakker and Van der Kolk, 2016) eight indicators to assess EU citizenship are developed based on outcomes of the bEUcitizen project so far and existing impact assessment guidelines and documents. The insights from these papers have been a starting point for this report.
In this report, we aim to include EU citizenship impacts in an impact assessment tool. When we include EU citizenship impacts, Bakker et al. (2016) argued it is necessary to include two specific elements into the impact assessment framework: (1) to assess EU citizenship impacts attention is needed for both EU citizenship rights and participation in the EU (political) community (the so called technical-rational and post-positive perspectives) , and (2) attention need to be paid to the EU and national level and the interface between the impact assessments on both levels. We explain these two elements further in chapter 2. In chapter 3 a practical ‘rules of thumb’ guide for carrying out an impact assessment is presented. In seven practical steps we explain how to carry out an impact assessment for EU citizenship. To make these steps transparent and workable we present tools for policymakers. These tools, presented as infographics, can be used by policymakers to see in a glance which steps to take in an impact assessment and where to think about when assessing for instance social and EU citizenship impacts. This will help to make the execution of impact assessments more workable and useable for policy makers on the European and the national level, especially with regard to EU citizenship. Furthermore, we do a proposal for revising existing impact assessment documents of the Commission. In chapter 4 we will explain this briefly. In annex I we present an extended version of the Guidance on social rights, now including EU citizenship, and annex II suggests a revision of the existing Impact Assessment Guideline. The report ends with a final note on how these proposals fit into the existing EU strategies.
Read the full report here: D11.3-impact assessment tools